In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We compare experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill alone and combinations of skill and luck. We find more risk taking with skill and luck as opposed to skill alone, particularly for males, and little overconfidence. Our data support an explanation based on differential attitudes toward luck by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high.
I. Introduction
The outcomes of many risky decisions depend on both skill and luck. For example, the payoff an entrepreneur receives from entering an industry will be determined by skill as well as a myriad of random factors or, more simply, "luck." Managerial decisions are also typically only partially determined by skill. For example, specific managerial actions can definitely affect the result of an R&D investment but do not determine it completely since numerous events that cannot be anticipated will also affect the result. Thus, any feedback managers receive about such decisions must be interpreted with caution. Successful outcomes may be entirely or partially due to luck. Indeed, failure to consider the role of luck can lead to taking excessive risks by investing too much in some projects or, alternatively, too little in others. Similarly, the performance of traders in financial markets depends on both skill and luck and it is important not to overestimate the degree of the control over the situation by mistaking luck for skill (Taleb 2007) .
Evidence suggests that many managers neglect the role of luck in their decisions and perceive managerial decision making as an opportunity to exert control using their skill to manage risk. Many do not think that luck and risk-taking are related, and some hold that "luck is a meaningless concept with regard to managerial decision making" (Shapira 1995, p. 48) .
Since the respective roles of skill and chance are confounded in the outcomes that people observe, it should come as little surprise that people have difficulty in distinguishing between luck-related and skill-related sources of success. At the same time, however, there is a considerable literature demonstrating that people often treat chance events as controllable (e.g., Langer 1975; Hogarth 1987) . However, if made explicitly aware that luck will play a greater role in determining future outcomes, do people take more or less risk? Do men and women react similarly to such increases in the role of luck?
In this paper, we address these questions experimentally by building on the market entry game of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) . In this game, participants can enter an experimental market of limited capacity where payoffs are determined by their relative ranking based on performance in a test. The novel feature of our setup is that in some rounds participants are informed that a random or luck component has perturbed their test-based rankings. That is, the payoffs in our experiment are determined by both skill and a specific luck component. 1 Confusing luck with skill can lead to overconfidence in skill (Langer & Roth 1975; Gervais & Odean 2001) . In turn, overconfidence in skill can increase the propensity to confuse luck with skill. People have a natural tendency to attribute success to internal factors -and thereby claim personal credit -but to blame external factors such as luck for failures (Miller & Ross 1975 ). In addition, there is evidence that in many situations people believe themselves more likely than others to experience good luck thereby implying unrealistic optimism (Weinstein 1980) . Overconfidence in skill combined with a bias toward optimism makes success dangerous because it can inflate both tendencies and lead to unreasonable risk taking. In the experiment reported below, we measure both self-confidence and beliefs regarding the role of luck in determining outcomes. We seek to understand how the former affects risk taking behavior as well as how actual outcomes affect beliefs.
To test whether risky decisions are affected by differential levels of luck in the outcomes of market entry games, we ran two experimental conditions using a within-subject design to control for individual differences. In one condition, participants were ranked by their skill and payoffs were fully determined by relative skill. In the other, skill rankings were adjusted by randomly drawn individual luck components such that the relation between relative skill and payoffs was imperfect. Moreover, participants were made aware of this fact.
On the one hand, one might imagine that, in the latter condition, the greater uncertainty would discourage risk taking such that the market entry rate would be reduced. Indeed, in an extreme version of this, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) reported lower entry rates when rankings were established entirely at random (i.e., with no skill component). On the other hand, there is evidence that greater uncertainty can induce greater optimism such that people take more risks (Armor & Taylor 2002) . Indeed, the mere presence of a skill component (however small) might still encourage risk taking.
In fact, we found that the participants entered the experimental market more (withinsubject comparison) when a combination of luck and skill, rather than only skill, determined their payoffs and, even though we used two levels of luck (big and small), this made no difference. In addition, we found that men reacted more (by entering relatively more) than women to the introduction of the explicit luck component in the game. Overall, mean group profit was negative in most rounds as more participants entered the markets than should have.
These results are puzzling in that we also find accurate assessments of numbers of entrants, little or no overconfidence, and an understanding that past experience with luck is not predictive of future outcomes. Our data support the explanation that, for people who assess their own skill as low, greater uncertainty induces greater optimism in future outcomes and thus more risk taking. In other words, if there is no hope of success when outcomes depend on skill, the introduction of chance can ignite optimistic beliefs. On the other hand, people who assess their skill as high, can still hope to achieve a good outcome whatever the role of chance. In addition, when outcomes are determined by both skill and chance, success can always be attributed to skill and luck blamed for failures. In both cases, positive views about self will not be dampened. Indeed, our participants tended to attribute success to their skill, while bad luck was more likely to be blamed for failures.
II. Experiment
Participants and sessions. Participants were recruited through invitations sent to the members of the database system of the Leex laboratory of Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the experiment was conducted on computers in the laboratory using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 1999) . No participant took part in more than one session. Upon arrival participants were randomly assigned to seats. They were identified by code numbers only.
Each participant had an individual printed copy of the instructions. Instructions also appeared on the screens. In addition, one experimenter read the instructions aloud. All questions were answered in private. Sessions lasted about one hour. There were six separate sessions, each with fifteen participants.
Procedure. Participants were informed that they were being given a credit of 15€ at the beginning of the experiment, and that at the end, their net earnings would be added to (or deducted from) the 15€. Moreover, their net earnings would depend on both their choices and the choices of other participants taking part in the same session. Participants were further told that the study was conducted anonymously and that their individual choices would not be known to other participants. Table I summarizes the experimental procedure for one of the experimental conditions explained in detail below.
There were two parts to the experiment. The first involved ten problems of multiplying two 2-digit numbers. Participants could use a pen and scratch paper. They were paid 0.50€ for each correct answer and informed that the more questions they got correct, and the faster they were, the easier it would be for them to earn more money in the second part of the experiment. The ten problems appeared one by one on the screen. Participants had 30 seconds to solve each problem. If no answer was provided within 30 seconds, the question was counted as "incorrect" and the next problem appeared automatically. After solving ten problems, participants were asked how many problems they thought they had solved correctly and how many of the fourteen other participants in the room they believed did better than them (i.e., answered more questions correctly and/or faster). At the end of the experiment, they were paid 0.50€ for each correct estimate. Feedback on the multiplication test was not given until the end of the experiment.
The second part of the experiment was a market entry game involving an experimental market with a capacity of five entrants and a total payoff to be divided among successful entrants of 25€. Each participant had to decide privately whether or not to enter. If they decided to stay out, the additional payoff was zero. If they decided to enter, the payoffs were determined by the number of entrants and the results of the multiplication test. If the number of entrants was five or less, the 25€ was divided equally among the entrants. If more than five participants decided to enter the competition, all entrants were ranked according to the number of problems solved correctly in the multiplication task (time taken to complete the test was used to break ties). The five best entrants earned 5€ each and the others lost 10€ each.
Before the first entry decision was made, participants were informed that there would be a total of twelve similar rounds. At the end of the experiment, four of the twelve rounds were chosen randomly by throwing a die. Final payoffs for the market entry game were determined by the mean of individual payoffs in these four rounds. Participants were informed in advance about how the final payoffs would be determined.
Before the first round, four quiz questions were administered to make sure that everyone understood the rules of the game. Participants were given three attempts to answer each question. Eighteen participants failed to provide a correct answer to one or two questions. We analyzed the data both with and without these participants and found that excluding these 18 participants did not change results significantly. We therefore report below the analyses of all data.
At the beginning of each round, participants were asked to forecast how many entrants would enter (including themselves) in the round. Accurate forecasts were rewarded with 0.50€. Participants then decided individually whether or not to enter the competition. Postdecision feedback for each round included the number of entrants and the participant's individual payoff. After the first six and the last six rounds participants were asked to indicate on an 11-point scale how risky these rounds were in their opinion (0 = "not risky at all" and 10 = "extremely risky").
For the last six rounds, the procedure for determining the performance ranking was changed by including an explicit luck component. Participants were told about the changes in the rules of the game immediately before the block of the modified rounds. In particular, at the beginning of each round, individual random luck parameters were drawn from a uniform distribution. There were seven possible "levels of luck": an improvement of the position in the original ranking by three places, two places, and one place; a worsening of the position in the ranking by three places, two places, and one place; and no change of the original position. The process of generating luck parameters was described to participants using the analogy of an urn containing seven balls of different colors where colors determined luck. In each modified round, after receiving performance feedback, participants were additionally asked to indicate on 11-point scales how lucky they thought they were in the round (0 = "not at all" and 10 = "extremely lucky") and how fair they thought their payoff was in the round (0 = "not at all" and 10 = "extremely fair"). Finally, after the block of six modified rounds, participants additionally indicated on 11-point scales how fair they thought their result was overall in these rounds (0 = "not at all" and 10 = "extremely fair") and what role, in their opinion, luck played in determining their payoffs in these six rounds (0 = "luck has not played any role"; and 10 = "luck has been decisive").
After all twelve rounds, participants received feedback on the number of correct answers and their total time spent on the multiplication test, indicated their age and sex, and answered 29 questions of the internal-external(IE)-scale questionnaire (Rotter 1966 ) that purports to measure individual locus of control. Locus of control refers to the extent to which individuals believe that they can control events. Individuals with a high internal locus of control (a low score on the Rotter scale) believe that their actions mainly determine future events whereas those at the other extreme believe that they have little control over what happens to them.
Finally, a 12-faced die was then thrown to determine the four rounds to be used to calculate total payoffs and the information on individual total payoffs appeared on the participants' screens. Participants were paid privately one-by-one at the end of the experimental session.
Design. The experimental design included two within-subject variables: round number and whether a randomly generated luck component was (luck rounds) or was not used (baseline rounds) to determine performance ranking in a given round. In addition, the design included two between-subject variables. First, we aimed to control possible order effects by running two sessions with baseline rounds preceding luck rounds and two sessions in the reverse order (i.e., luck rounds before baseline rounds). Second, we ran two additional sessions with a much larger luck component. In these two sessions, the position in the original ranking could increase or decrease by nine, six, or three places (vs. three, two, one place in the other luck sessions). In these two sessions, baseline rounds preceded luck rounds. We refer to these sessions as the big luck condition and to the other sessions as the small luck condition. In summary, there were three between-subject conditions: (1) baseline -small luck, (2) small luck -baseline, and (3) baseline -big luck.
Equilibrium predictions. Assuming risk neutrality and no private information about the probability of success on entry, there are multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria with seven players (47%) entering a market that has a capacity of five. At equilibrium, participants do not expect to receive a larger payoff by changing their strategy, i.e., by entering if the decision was to stay out and staying out if the decision was to enter. In our game, when there are fewer than seven entrants, a participant who stayed out could have received a positive payoff by entering, and with more than seven entrants, a participant who entered could have avoided an expected loss by staying out. In particular, the expected payoff of each of seven entrants is   Table II details expected payoffs for all numbers of entrants (upper panel, first column).
Provided that players cannot coordinate, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each risk-neutral player (without private information about the probability of success on entry) enters with a probability p. The value of p is found by equating the expected payoff of entry and the payoff of staying out (see also Rapoport et al. 1998 
If all players know their relative performance on the test, then clearly only the top five players (33% of all potential entrants) will enter. However, if players have imperfect information about their test performance, it is instructive to speculate how they might take account of competitors when assessing relative performance. Considerable evidence suggests that people tend focus on themselves and neglect others, thereby adopting a so-called "inside view" (Kahneman & Lovallo 1993; Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Kruger 1999; Moore, Oesch, & Zietsma 2007) . Thus, imperfect information about test performance could imply biased subjective estimates of probabilities of success. For example, assume that this bias is captured by a parameter  (-1> >1) that adjusts the probability of success on entry. Then, a player's (biased) expected payoff of entry when there are E entrants (E > 5) is Table II provides equilibrium results for ≠ For example, if = 0.2, pure-strategy Nash equilibria occur when nine players (60%) enter the market, and if = -0.2, six players (40%) enter. In terms of mixed strategies, if = 0.2, the equilibrium probability of entry is 62% (9.3 entrants), and if = -0.2, it is 46% (6.9 entrants).
We do not make any specific assumption about participants' risk preferences but control for it within-subject since all participants took part in both baseline and luck conditions (see all Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Moore & Cain 2007) . Our primary measure of interest is within-subject differences in behavior between the baseline and luck conditions.
III. Results
Of the 90 participants, 42 were male. Participants were between 18 and 36 years of age, 21 on average. Total earnings per participant were between 5.50€ and 25.90€ with a mean of 18.15€.
Test performance and confidence. Participants slightly overestimated the number of problems they solved correctly in the multiplication test. Participants solved a mean of 7.9 (out of 10) problems correctly, while their mean estimate of this number was 8.6 (the difference is statistically significant, p<0.01, z = -4.34, n = 90, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Participants overestimated their relative position in the performance ranking by one place on average (p<0.05, z = 2.53, n = 90, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Not surprisingly, it was easier for participants to estimate their absolute score than their rank as estimating the latter requires making inferences about the scores of others. The correlation between own score and estimated score was 0.64 (Pearson, p<0.01, n = 90); the correlation between own rank and estimated rank was 0.35 (Pearson, p<0.01, n = 90). Overall, participants' estimates of their own scores and ranks are imperfect.
The manifestations of overconfidence were mainly due to the male participants. Men overestimated their number of correctly solved problems and their position in the ranking by 0.9 problems and 2.3 places, respectively. The analogous measures for women were 0.7 problems and 0.3 places thereby suggesting no significant overconfidence among them. The gender difference in relative confidence (i.e., regarding placement in the ranking) was marginally significant, p = 0.07, z = 1.87, n = 90, Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Figure I shows the distribution of guessed own ranks and own number of correct answers by gender. The distributions of guesses of own number of correct answers (lower panel) do not differ much by gender. However, more women than men fall into the right-hand side of the distribution of guessed own ranks (upper panel) that corresponds to a lower opinion about own relative performance. The difference in relative confidence cannot be explained by differences in performance because women and men solved approximately the same number of problems (7.85 and 7.90; z = -0.36, ns, n = 90, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) and occupied, on average, the same positions in the ranking (7.8 and 8.1; z = 0.34, ns, n = 90, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Indeed, an ordered logistic regression of own guessed rank on a dummy variable for female and actual rank yielded a significant positive coefficient (z = 2.94, p<0.01) for the dummy variable female (n=90,  2 (2)=22.10, pseudo-R 2 = 0.050). That is, controlling for actual performance, women were significantly less confident about their relative performance than men.
The gender gap in relative confidence echoes the findings of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) . In their experiment, men and women performed equally well on a test, but women were more likely to underrate their relative performance: 75% of men thought they were best in their group (of four participants), while only 43% of women shared this belief.
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Entry behavior and profit. The data reveal "excess entry" in that there were between six and fourteen entrants each round (40% -93% of all participants). (Recall market capacity was five entrants). Figure II shows the actual number of entrants in each session and the mean number of entrants predicted by participants at the beginning of each experimental round. As a reference point, we have added horizontal lines corresponding to the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction of 7.9 entrants (assuming risk-neutrality and no private information about relative performance on the test).
The decreasing slope of entry curves in Figure II suggests some learning from performance feedback. However, the number of entrants only approached the mixed-strategy equilibrium of 7.9 players in some rounds. Overall, this happened more often in the baseline condition than in the luck condition. A surprising finding is the relative accuracy with which participants anticipated the number of entrants. There was no consistent tendency to over-or underestimate the number of entrants. The mean difference between the mean predicted and actual number of entrants was -0.13, and the mean absolute difference was 2.00 persons.
There was no significant difference between the baseline and luck rounds in terms of the magnitude of the errors. 4 Group payoff per round was negative in 60 rounds and positive only in 12 rounds.
Mean group payoff across all sessions was -16€. Figure III details the distribution of group payoffs.
Attributions and fairness. Participants correctly indicated that luck played a bigger role in big as opposed to small luck rounds (where the possible impact of luck was three times smaller) -mean of 6.6 vs. 5.1 on a scale where 0 = "luck has not played any role" and 10 = "luck has been decisive" (p<0.05, z = -2.18, n = 90, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Moreover, larger individual payoffs were considered as being "fairer." Specifically, the Spearman's rank correlation between mean individual payoffs across the luck rounds and reported fairness (0 = "not fair at all" and 10 = "extremely fair") was 0.67 (p<0.01, n = 90).
On the other hand, the Spearman's rank correlation between the mean profit that each participant earned in the luck rounds and beliefs about the role of luck was negative, -0.22 (p<0.05, n = 90). That is, individuals who earned less money in the luck rounds were more likely to attribute the result to luck than those who earned more. An ordered logistic regression of the belief of the role of luck on the mean profit earned in luck rounds, the number of times the participant decided to enter the market in luck rounds, a dummy for the 4 The mean difference between expected and actual entries was -0.09 persons in the baseline and -0.18 persons in the luck condition, the difference is not significant, z = 0.24, n = 1080, Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The mean absolute difference between expectations and realizations did not differ between conditions either: 2.03 and 1.97 persons, z = 0.15, n = 1080, Wilcoxon rank-sum test. big luck rounds, and absolute confidence (defined as the difference between guessed own and actual number of correct answers in the test) yielded significant coefficients (p<0.05) for all independent variables. 5 Table III details the regression coefficients (Model 1). The effects of the mean individual profit and absolute confidence are negative in this model, implying that participants who earned more in the luck rounds, and who were more (over)confident about the number of questions answered correctly in the test, were less likely to attribute their profits to luck. In addition, those who entered more in the luck rounds were more likely to attribute their monetary outcomes to luck.
To test whether there were gender effects in the association between confidence and attribution, we added an interaction Confidence in absolute performance*Female to the model. The amended model yielded a significant positive coefficient for the interaction that offsets the direct effect of confidence for female participants (Model 2 in Table III ). This suggests that the association between confidence and attribution described above (i.e., greater confidence implying attributing profits more to skill than luck), was only present in men.
Women with greater self-confidence as opposed to less confident women did not tend to attribute their results more to skill than luck.
Finally, we found no significant correlation between beliefs about the role of luck in the market entry game and IE-scores (Rotter 1966 ), Spearman's rank correlation of 0.04 (ns, n=90).
Entry behavior and its determinants. Across all sessions, there was a mean of 8.8 entrants in the baseline rounds and 9.4 entrants in luck rounds. Figure IV shows the distribution of the number of entrants per rounds separately for the baseline and luck condition and for the first and last six rounds. The difference between the baseline and luck condition is significant in the first six rounds. The mean number of entrants was 8.6 in the baseline and 10.8 in the luck conditions (p<0.01, z = -3.05, n = 36, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
However, given the design of the experiment, within-subject comparison is more appropriate. Figure IV and Table IV about 
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We used logistic regression to estimate the significance of the impact of the withinsubject luck manipulation on entry behavior. We coded the variable Entry as 1 if the participant decided to enter the competition in a given round and as 0 otherwise, and used a dummy variable for Luck (1=luck rounds, and 0=baseline rounds). These regressions showed that, on the within-subject level, the effect of the dummy Luck is significant, as shown by the random-effect 6 logistic models presented in Table IV. To interpret these models, note from Model 1 that, by itself, the dummy variable Luck does not explain much variance in entry behavior. However, this is not the case in more complete models that include independent variables describing experimental conditions and individual characteristics (Model 2), interactions (Model 3), and an independent lagged variable and its interaction with another variable (Model 4).
Model 2 includes as independent variables Luck, Big luck, Order, Female (as dummy variables), round and session, guessed numbers of correct answers in the test, guessed own position in the ranking, forecasted number of entrants, and the IE score. Model 3 tests whether the effect of manipulating luck was stronger for some participants (e.g., females vs. males, those who believed that their performance on the test was better vs. worse, those who scored higher vs. lower on the IE scale) and whether the order in which the rounds were run 6 Analogous fixed-effects logistic regressions give similar results.
affected the relative role of luck. Model 4 controls in addition for the payoff that participants earned in the previous round and checks whether the effect of the lagged payoff was different in the luck as opposed to the baseline condition. (It thus excludes the first round for which no lagged data are available.) All three models (Model 2, 3, and 4) yield significant coefficients for the dummy Luck whereby suggesting that participants entered the competition more in the luck than in baseline rounds. Moreover, a significant negative coefficient of the variable Round suggests that participants learned from performance feedback. There were no significant differences in entry behavior between sessions, between conditions run in different orders, and between participants that had different IE-scores. The models show positive effects for the dummy Female (that we discuss below) and for the lagged payoff (Model 4). The latter effect suggests that participants were more likely to enter the competition in a given round when the payoff earned in the previous round was higher.
Guessed own rank was not predictive of entry behavior and neither was the forecasted number of entrants. However, those participants whose guessed number of correct answers was larger were more likely to enter the market. This implies that participants ignored other players when making their decisions, even though outcomes of entry were determined by relative rather than absolute performance.
Several interactions are significant in Models 3 and 4. First, a negative interaction
Guessed own correct answers*Luck suggests that the effect of the dummy Luck (4.54 in Model 3 and 4.66 in Model 4) was about 0.30 points smaller per each additional guessed own correct answer. That is, participants who believed that they answered fewer questions correctly in the test were more sensitive to the luck manipulation. They reacted more strongly to the introduction of the explicit luck component by entering relatively more in the luck as opposed to the baseline condition. On the contrary, participants who believed that their absolute performance on the test was high were less responsive to the introduction of the luck component. This is an important finding that we discuss further below.
Second, the interaction Order*Luck is negative and significant. It implies that the effect of the introduction of the luck component was stronger when the baseline rounds were run before the luck rounds as opposed to the inverse order. For example, in Model 4 the coefficient of the dummy Luck is 4.66 for the sessions where the baseline rounds were run before the luck rounds (Order = 0) and 4.66 -1.88 = 2.78 for the sessions where the order was inversed (Order = 1).
Third, a negative interaction of the lagged payoff and the dummy Luck (Model 4) suggests that participants reacted to performance feedback differently in the baseline and luck rounds. The interaction offsets the effect of the lagged payoff in the luck condition. In particular, the coefficient of the lagged payoff is 0.11 for the baseline rounds (Luck = 0) and 0.11 -0.12 = -0.01 for the luck rounds (Luck = 1). This implies that participants correctly understood that past performance was a less perfect predictor of future performance in the luck than baseline rounds. However, it did not prevent them from entering the competition more in the luck than baseline rounds.
Fourth, a significant negative interaction Female*Big luck suggests that women and men reacted differently to the introduction of the luck component. To elucidate, note that the main effect for the dummy Female is positive and significant and implies that overall women entered the competition more than men. Indeed, across all rounds, 66% of women as opposed to 55% of men entered the competition. The negative interaction Female*Big luck, however, offsets almost completely this gender difference (e.g., in Model 4, the coefficient of the dummy Female is 2.30 for Big luck = 0 and 2.30 -2.84 = -0.54 for Big luck = 1). That is, in the Big luck sessions, there was no significant difference in behavior between male and female participants.
To clarify these latter findings, Figure V 
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Random-effect logistic models of entry fitted separately on the data from male and female participants (Models 4a and 4b in Table IV) Overall, the effect of independent variables and interactions described above is more evident among males (Model 4a) than females (Model 4b) and men's decisions are more predictable (pseudo-R 2 of 0.202 for men and 0.139 for women). Interestingly, the interaction IE-score * Luck is positive and significant in the model for women's entry decisions (Model 4b). This implies that, in the luck condition, women who scored higher on the IE-scale (i.e., more external locus of control or greater belief that luck determines outcomes) were more likely to enter the competition than women who scored lower (i.e., more internal locus of control).
Did self-confidence affect participants' entry decisions? To estimate the impact of confidence on entry decisions, we included absolute and relative confidence in test performance in Model 5 (Table IV) . Our interest was to understand whether, given the same level of performance, greater confidence implied higher probability of entry. We therefore also included performance variables in the model, such as the number of correct answers, total time spent in answering all questions, and actual position in the ranking. We also added the interactions of the confidence variables and the dummy variable Luck. The model shows that overall, neither absolute nor relative confidence affected entry decisions. However, the interaction of relative confidence and the variable Luck is positive and significant. It suggests that entry was determined more by confidence in relative performance in the luck than in the baseline condition. However, the evidence is not strong. When we fit random-effect logistic models of entry analogous to Model 5 separately on the data from the baseline and luck condition, we do not find significant effects for either absolute or relative confidence in either of the two models. Further studies should address the question of how confidence affects decisions in competitive contexts when randomness plays an important role as opposed to situations where it is less of a factor.
Overall, these experimental results do not confirm an existing idea that [excess] entry is driven by [over]confidence (Camerer & Lovallo 1999) . In our sample, it was not confidence but objective performance as measured by position in the performance ranking that affected entry. That is, participants who performed worse in the test entered the competition less for any confidence level. Indeed, participants with a position in the ranking of 8 and better entered the market in, on average, 4.4 baseline rounds and 4.2 luck rounds (both out of 6). On average, participants with a position in the ranking of 9 and worse entered the market in 2.5 baseline rounds and 3.3 luck rounds. Mean payoff in the baseline rounds was -4.07€ for participants with a position of 9 and worse and 1.96€ for participants with a position of 8 and better. The analogous numbers in the luck rounds were -3.77€ and 0.90€, respectively. Overall, negative mean profits in each round indicate that the self-selection was imperfect.
IV. Discussion
In many naturally occurring decisions, outcomes depend on both skill and chance. In this paper, we report an experiment where people take risk by entering a competition when either skill alone determines outcomes or when skill and luck both play roles. Previous work on market entry games has contrasted situations where, on the one hand, payoffs depend on relative skill in a test as opposed to chance alone (Camerer & Lovallo 1999) and, on the other hand, where payoffs depend on relative skill in tests differing in difficulty (Moore & Cain 2007) . Results indicate sensitivity to both types of manipulation. Participants enter more when payoffs depend on relative skill as opposed to chance alone and when tests are perceived as easy as opposed to difficult. Our investigation is the first to study the joint effects of relative skill and chance.
Whereas one might expect that the introduction of a chance component would dampen risk taking in the form of entry decisions, this did not turn out to be the case. Instead, our participants entered competition relatively more when the results of the competition were determined by both their relative performance and a chance component. This tendency was especially clear among men.
Why did participants enter more when the outcome was determined by both skill and luck as opposed to luck alone? Our preferred explanation involves a distinction between participants with low and high levels of skills (see results concerning the Guessed own correct answers*Luck interaction presented above). Consider, first, individuals who believe they have low skill levels. Given this assessment, they would normally stay out of the competition if outcomes depended only on skill. However, the introduction of a luck component provides both a chance to succeed (where previously there was none) and an excuse in the event of failure. Thus entering the competition becomes more attractive. Now consider individuals who have high skill levels. Clearly, they will enter when outcomes depend only on skill and one might expect them to enter less frequently in the presence of luck (because success is no longer guaranteed). However, entry is not necessarily less attractive if either they just ignore the complications of luck (see also below) and/or they know they can always blame bad outcomes on luck. Consistent with men being more responsive than women to the introduction of luck by taking more risk, we find in addition that among men, greater selfconfidence implies stronger attribution of outcomes to skill than luck, while women's attributions are not associated with self-confidence.
A further (related) explanation could be that participants realized that not just their More entry in the presence of both skill and luck is also consistent with concerns about self-image in the ability to perform well in skill-sensitive tasks where the need for protecting self-image can lead to making choices that are easy to justify (Larrick 1999; see also Koszegi 2006) . In case of failure, bad luck can be blamed for doing worse than expected such that positive self-image will stay intact. In case of success, self-image is enhanced. Therefore, more entry should be observed when skill together with luck determines outcomes. In fact, the participants who earned less money in our market entry game when both luck and skill determined their performance were more likely to attribute the result to luck. This result is also consistent with the literature on self-attribution bias (e.g., Miller & Ross 1975) .
The work on "need for achievement" might also be relevant to our results (Atkinson 1957) . The key idea here is that, when choosing between skill-related tasks of different difficulty levels, those who are motivated to achieve success as opposed to avoid failure will tend to select tasks that are intermediate in difficulty. In other words, there is some preference for uncertainty in outcomes that is consistent with preferring outcomes based on skill and luck as opposed to skill alone. Whereas we suspect that our experimental participants are more likely to be motivated by achieving success than avoiding failure, we did not explicitly measure "need for achievement" and thus must leave testing this hypothesis to future work.
Overall, our participants took too much risk and, as a result, their payoffs were lower than they could have achieved by staying out of the competition more. In addition, although there was evidence of some learning through repeated experience, this did not eliminate "excess entry." At the same time, our participants seemed to understand correctly that past performance is less predictive of future performance when luck plays a bigger role.
In our market entry game, confidence in own performance, measured on both absolute and relative levels, did not affect entry decisions, contrary to what Camerer and Lovallo (1999) have suggested. What we observed resembled imperfect self-selection into the game based on skill (i.e., test performance). (For a theoretical model of entry illustrating such selfselection, see Hogarth and Karelaia 2008) . In addition, men were more confident than women in their performance (see also Lenney 1977; Barber and Odean 2001) . And yet, men did not compete with other participants overall relatively more often than women contrary to findings by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) . In that study, men entered a competitive tournament more than women for any performance level. What are the possible reasons for the difference in findings? Although Niederle and Vesterlund's (2007) participants took decisions in tournaments that differed from our experiment, they also used a math test to measure performance and confidence. One difference was that our participants were placed in semiprivate cubicles and could not see all other players whereas in Niederle and Vesterlund's experiment, participants could see each other and thus non-verbal cues could have had some influence. It is also possible that in our (mostly undergraduate) sample, women were, on average, used to performing academically better than men and thus took more (or at least not less) risk in a task related to performance.
This investigation poses an intriguing puzzle. Our respondents were remarkably accurate at predicting the number of participants entering each round (across all conditions).
At the same time, they only overplaced their ranking on average by one position. Why then did they enter markets where the most they could earn was 5€ and the cost of being wrong was 10€? In both the baseline and luck condition, there was excess entry in that mean profits were negative each round. There seemed to have been a pervasive overoptimism or "myopic self-focus" ) that was only marginally affected by learning. We suspect that the fact that payoffs reflected relative skill contributed to some measure of "illusion of control" (Langer 1975 ) -and possibly also because the task used here to establish relative skill was not that difficult. However, excess entry, defined as entry superior to market capacity, is also present in market entry games when the skill task is very difficult (Moore & Cain 2007) . Further research should investigate conditions of illusion of control in market entry competitions. What levels of feelings of skill are necessary for participants to feel they have "control"?
Our data contain some tentative evidence that confidence in own skill serves as an anchor for self-selection into competitive risky tasks more when uncertainty about the outcome of the task is greater. Further studies should address the question of how confidence affects decisions in competitive contexts when randomness plays an important role as opposed to situations when outcomes are less dependent on chance.
To conclude, we augmented the realism of the market entry paradigm by including an explicit chance component in determining payoffs and found that people take more risk when both skill and chance, as opposed to skill alone, determine outcomes of their actions. Our data support the explanation that for people who assess their own skill as low, greater uncertainty induces greater optimism in future outcomes and more risk taking. On the other hand, people who assess their skill as high still hope that this will ensure good outcomes whatever the role of chance. There is no question that both skill and luck contribute to the outcomes of most decisions in naturally occurring environments and that it is hard to disentangle objectively the relative contributions of both as well as to understand people's perceptions. Clearly much research is needed to understand how factors such as optimism in future outcomes, the desire to maintain positive self-image, myopic self-focus, and self-confidence affect risk taking in these circumstances. Notes: * alpha is an adjustment coefficient of the subjective probability of success on entry. **=25€ if 5 or fewer enter; 25€ -10€*(E-5) if E>5 enter. . Random-effect models were fitted. z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.10. 
